Milton Friedman's Comments on 1929-1933 sound like comments on today

There is one sense---and, so far as we can see, only one---in which a case can be made for the proposition that monetary decline [1930-1933] was a consequence of the economic decline. . . . The [Federal Reserve] System was operating in a climate of opinion that in the main regarded recessions and depressions as curative episodes, necessary in order to purge the body economic of the aftereffects of its earlier excesses. The prevailing opinion also confused money and credit; ... regarded it as desirable that the stock of money should respond to the "needs of trade," rising in expansions and falling in contractions; and attached much greater importance to the maintenance of the gold standard and the stability of exchanges than to the maintenance of internal stability. . . . Given that milieu, it can be argued that . . . [the Fed] could not have been expected to prevent the appreciable decline in the stock of money during 1930, because it and others as well regarded the decline as a desirable offset to earlier speculative excess; and that its failure to react vigorously . . . reflected the attitude that it was desirable to liquidate "bad" banks, to let "nature take its course" rather than to support the financial system "artificially".

A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960, Friedman & Schwartz, pp. 691-692.